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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—SKIRTING THE WARRANT CLAUSE: STATE
V. HARRIS AND THE SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION
Crime is contagious.
If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that
in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means—to declare that the government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would
1
bring terrible retribution.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are at home one evening when the police barge
into your house without knocking, serve you with a temporary
restraining order you know nothing about, and simultaneously execute a
search warrant. The police place you under arrest, force you to open
your safe to allow them to search it, and even bring in dogs. Now
imagine your indignation when you discover that you are not being
prosecuted for the underlying grounds of the restraining order, but rather
the results of the search conducted in your home—and the only basis for
this warrant is the uncorroborated word of your ex-significant other.
You would think your constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
government searches of your home has been violated. But the highest
court in New Jersey disagrees.
In State v. Harris the New Jersey Supreme Court held that domestic
violence search warrants based on reasonable cause will suffice in place
of warrants based on probable cause under the statutory scheme of the
Recognizing that the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act.2
Constitution explicitly states that warrants should be based on probable
cause, 3 the high court mentioned the special needs exception without
analyzing whether it fit the situation and moved on with its analysis.4
The situation at issue, trying to control the combination of domestic
violence and deadly weapons, is admittedly a very challenging one.5
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
2. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 18 (N.J. 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (West
2012).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2.
4. Harris, 50 A.3d at 24-26.
5. See generally Lisa Memoli & Gina Plotino, Enforcement or Pretense: The Courts
and the Domestic Violence Act, 15 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 39 (1993) (discussing some of the
cases and lapses in enforcement that led to the push to change the statute in New Jersey);
39
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But that is not reason enough to dispense with constitutional rights. 6
Section I of this Note will lay out the different pieces that make up
the puzzle of the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in State v.
Harris. Part I.A presents a brief overview of the warrant clause. Part
I.B explains how the statutory scheme of the Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act (PDVA) operates. Part I.C recounts the facts and
procedural history leading up to the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s
decision in State v. Harris. 7
Section II argues that the constitutional requirement that “no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause” 8 cannot be circumvented
by way of the special needs exception in this case.9 The majority in
Harris held, for the first time, that reasonable cause to believe that
weapons were present and that there was a serious risk of harm to the
victim was sufficient to issue a search warrant under section 25-18(j) of
the PDVA. 10 Parts II.A through D discuss the elements of the special
needs exception to the warrant requirement and assert that the New
Jersey Supreme Court erred in its conclusion that the PDVA scheme
qualifies as such an exception.
Section III explores the emergency aid and community caretaking
exceptions to the warrant requirement and contends that neither of them
replaces nor excuses the requirement of probable cause for search
warrants under the PDVA. Finally, Section IV compares New Jersey’s
approach to tackling the serious problem of domestic violence involving
deadly weapons with the approaches of several other states and proposes
the adoption of the standard suggested by the dissenting justices in
Harris.

Michael Luo, In Some States, Gun Rights Trump Orders of Protection, N.Y. TIMES (March
17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/us/facing-protective-orders-and-allowed-to-ke
ep-guns.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&&pagewanted=print.
6. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
7. 50 A.3d at 18-21.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2. The New Jersey Constitution uses nearly identical
wording to provide the same protection to its citizens. N.J. CONST. art.I, ¶ 7 (“no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause . . . .”).
9. Harris, 50 A.3d at 31 (Albin, J., dissenting) (“The United States Supreme Court has
never suggested—even remotely—that the special-needs doctrine would justify a home search
in circumstances such as presented here.”).
10. Id. at 27 (majority opinion) (“Here…the domestic violence search . . .was entirely
proper.”); id. at 32 (Albin, J., dissenting) (“We have never directly addressed whether the
[possession and heightened risk of danger to the victim] prongs for the issuance of a search
warrant . . . can be based on less than probable cause.”).
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I. THE LAW AND THE FACTS OF STATE V. HARRIS
A. The Warrant Clause
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 11 This protection extends to both civil and criminal searches.12
The framers of the Constitution were concerned with protecting the
security of the people’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”13
Particularly, the Supreme Court has declared that the Fourth Amendment
is aimed primarily at protecting unreasonable physical intrusions by the
government into the home. 14
If searches and seizures are conducted without a warrant, they are
considered presumptively unreasonable. 15 The Fourth Amendment
states “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” 16 The Supreme Court has
explicitly affirmed a straightforward reading of the Fourth Amendment
by relying on its plain text in holding: “The Constitution prescribes …
that where the matter is of such a nature as to require a judicial warrant,
it is also of such a nature as to require probable cause.” 17
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1.
12. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (“[W]e have held the Fourth
Amendment applicable to the activities of civil as well as criminal authorities.”); see also
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 2
(1997) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment applies equally to civil and criminal law enforcement. Its
text speaks to all government searches and seizures, for whatever reason. Its history is not
uniquely bound up with criminal law.”).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1.
14. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”).
15. Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)
(“[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without
proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.”), superseded by statute, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)
(“Absence of any judicial approval is persuasive authority that it is unlawful.”). But see
AMAR, supra note 12, at 5-10 (arguing that the construction of the Fourth Amendment and the
historical evidence weigh against a presumption of unreasonableness in the absence of a
warrant).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2.
17. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 (1987). But see Barry Jeffrey Stern,
Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1385, 1402 (1994) (“[T]he preconstitutional history does not establish that the framers intended the Fourth Amendment to
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Realizing that the demands of public safety do not always allow for
the process of obtaining a warrant, 18 the Court has come to recognize
several “well-delineated exceptions” to the presumptive warrant
requirement. 19 In specific situations, the warrant, or even the underlying
probable cause, is forgiven. Where the Court has decided that the
warrant is for one reason or another impracticable, the Court instead uses
an interest-balancing test to ensure that the search is “reasonable” under
the Fourth Amendment. 20
In particular, this Note focuses on the special needs exception to the
warrant requirement, both because the New Jersey Supreme Court relied
on it and because it seems to be the most applicable exception to the
searches conducted under the PDVA. In order for this exception to
apply: (1) there must be a “special[] need beyond” ordinary law
enforcement purposes; 21 (2) the subject(s) of the search must have a
reduced expectation of privacy; 22 and (3) the requirement of obtaining a
warrant or probable cause prior to conducting a search must be a
practical hindrance to protecting the special need.23 If these conditions
are met, a search warrant based on probable cause is replaced with
interest-balancing to determine the reasonableness of the search. 24
B.

The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 and Its
Interpretation

The current version of the PDVA 25 was enacted in 1991, repealing
the earlier statute of the same name originally enacted in 1981.26 The
preclude a warrant requirement for searches and seizures that are constitutionally reasonable
but not supported by the traditional definition of probable cause.”).
18. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (listing several
circumstances in which the warrant requirement has been waived for reasons relating to
protection of the public).
19. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
20. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403-04 (“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable.’ Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions . . . . An action is
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment . . . viewed objectively.”) (internal citations
omitted).
21. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 348-49 (Powell, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
24. See id. at 351.
25. For the purposes of this Note, the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA)
encompasses N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17 to -33 (West 2012).
26. See generally Maura Beth Johnson, Note, Home Sweet Home?: New Jersey’s
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 234 (1993).
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New Jersey Legislature sought “to assure victims of domestic violence
the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.”27 The
Legislature “stress[ed] that the primary duty of a law enforcement
officer when responding to a domestic violence call is to enforce the
laws allegedly violated and to protect the victim.” 28 According to the
New Jersey Supreme Court, “[b]ecause the [Prevention of] Domestic
Violence Act is remedial in nature, it is to be liberally construed to
achieve its salutary purposes.” 29 In order to accomplish these goals, the
PDVA provides both criminal and civil remedies.30
On the criminal side, when a police officer has probable cause to
believe that domestic violence has occurred, he or she can arrest the
suspected abuser and “upon observing or learning that a weapon is on
the premises, seize any weapon that the officer reasonably believes
would expose the victim to a risk of serious bodily injury.” 31 However,
according to New Jersey’s Domestic Violence Procedures Manual: “If
the domestic violence assailant or the possessor of the weapon refuses to
surrender the weapon or to allow the officer to enter the premises to
search for the named weapon, the officer should obtain a Domestic
Violence Warrant for the Search and Seizure of Weapons.” 32 This
search warrant is the same in both the criminal and civil contexts.33
On the civil side, section 25-28(j) authorizes the victim to file a
complaint with a Family Part judge seeking a temporary restraining
order (TRO) which may include other forms of ex parte relief including
the issuance of a warrant to search for and seize weapons. 34
Emergency relief may include forbidding the defendant from
returning to the scene of the domestic violence, forbidding the
defendant from possessing any firearm or other weapon... ordering
the search for and seizure of any such weapon at any location where
the judge has reasonable cause to believe the weapon is located and
the seizure of any firearms purchaser identification card or permit to
purchase a handgun issued to the defendant and any other

27. § 2C:25-18.
28. Id.
29. Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 393 (N.J. 1998).
30. Id.
31. § 2C:25-21 (emphasis added).
32. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROCEDURES MANUAL, § 3.10.1(F)
(2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/family/ dvprcman.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2014) [hereinafter MANUAL].
33. To see a blank affidavit and search warrant form, see MANUAL, supra note 32, at
app. 19.
34. § 2C:25-28(j); MANUAL, supra note 32, § 5.10.3.
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appropriate relief. 35

This Note will focus in particular on the search warrant authorized by
section 2C:25-28(j) which is at issue in Harris. 36
While section 2C:25-28(j) acknowledges that there must be
“reasonable cause” as to the location of the weapon before a judge
orders a search and seizure of any weapons, 37 there is no further
direction regarding what kind of showing is needed to issue the search
warrant. 38 A New Jersey appellate court interpreted the search warrant
issued under the PDVA to require “reasonable cause” as to three
elements in State v. Johnson: 39
[W]here there is reasonable cause to believe that, (1) an act of
domestic violence has been committed by [the] defendant (2) the
defendant possesses or has access to a firearm or other weapon ...
and (3) defendant’s possession or access to that weapon poses a
heightened or increased risk of danger to the victim, then the
issuance of a search warrant as authorized by [section] 2C:25-28j
40
does not violate Fourth Amendment principles.

“Reasonable cause,” while not defined in the PDVA itself, has been
considered “akin to ‘reasonable suspicion,’ which New Jersey courts
have found to be a more relaxed standard than ‘probable cause.’” 41 To
meet reasonable suspicion, “[a]n officer must be able to ‘point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.’”42
35. § 2C:25-28(j) (emphasis added).
36. Although the facts in State v. Harris only concerned the civil statute, as mentioned,
the search warrant is available to police in the criminal context as well. State v. Harris, 50
A.3d 15, 18 (N.J. 2012). See MANUAL, supra note 32, § 3.10.1(F).
37. § 2C:25-28(j).
38. Harris, 50 A.3d at 32 (Albin, J., dissenting).
39. State v. Johnson, 799 A.2d 608, 611 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) disapproved
by State v. Dispoto, 913 A.2d 791 (N.J. 2007). In Johnson, the appellate division affirmed the
suppression of evidence where a search warrant issued under § 2C:25-28(j) for weapons
lacked specificity as to the location, and led to marijuana but no weapons. Id. at 614-15.
40. Id. at 626. This test was incorporated into the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROCEDURES
MANUAL. See MANUAL, supra note 32, at § 5.10.4.
41. State v. Perkins, 817 A.2d 364, 369 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) abrogated by
State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012). New Jersey courts have held that “[p]robable cause
is… a well-grounded suspicion or belief.” State in Interest of J.G., 701 A.2d 1260, 1273 (N.J.
1997) (quoting State v. DeSimone, 288 A.2d 849, 850 (N.J. 1972)). Other courts have found
similar Supreme Court language to be the equivalent of a probable cause standard. See United
States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 490 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that “the Court’s inquiry under the
‘probable cause’ and ‘reason to believe’ standards is the same . . . .”).
42. Perkins, 817 A.2d at 369-70. The Supreme Court of the United States
acknowledges that the concepts of probable cause and reasonable suspicion are difficult to
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The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Dispoto corrected the
interpretation by the appellate court in Johnson, holding that probable
cause is required to issue a search warrant in regards to the first element
of the Johnson test: whether an act of domestic violence had occurred. 43
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not, however, overrule “reasonable
cause” as the standard for the other two elements necessary for the
issuance of a warrant for the search and seizure of weapons under
section 2C:25–28(j). 44
Up until the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Harris, the
searches authorized under the PDVA had not been used to “advance a
criminal investigation against an alleged abuser.”45 Furthermore, the
Harris court expressly held, for the first time, that “[section] 2C:25–
28(j) ... permits issuance of a warrant upon reasonable cause.” 46
C. State v. Harris
The victim, identified as W.J., sought and received a TRO from a
Family Part judge. 47 W.J. signed a sworn statement expressing that she
and the defendant, Carlton Harris, had a dating relationship and that he
had committed acts of domestic violence against her.48 These acts
“include[d] beating her in the face, stalking her daily, repeatedly
define, but has contrasted them:
[w]e have described reasonable suspicion simply as ‘a particularized and objective
basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, and probable cause to
search as existing where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant
a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
43. State v. Dispoto, 913 A.2d 791, 798 n.3 (N.J. 2007).
44. Harris, 50 A.3d at 32 (Albin, J., dissenting) (“We have never directly addressed
whether the remaining two prongs for the issuance of a search warrant in Johnson can be
based on less than probable cause.”).
45. Dispoto, 913 A.2d at 798 (“[T]he remedial protections afforded under []PDVA are
intended for the benefit of victims of domestic violence and are not meant to serve as a pretext
for obtaining information to advance a criminal investigation against an alleged abuser.”). See
also Perkins, 817 A.2d at 371 (“[U]nless the factual circumstances justify a search under a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement, a search and resulting seizure under [the
PDVA] … is deemed reasonable and thereby passes constitutional muster so long as the
results are not used to facilitate a criminal prosecution.”); State v. Johnson, 799 A.2d 608, 624
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“[T]he analysis of the validity of the warrant and search
cannot be equated with that applied to a search and seizure where the purpose is to secure
evidence in a criminal prosecution.”).
46. Harris, 50 A.3d at 18.
47. State v. Harris, No. A-6112-09T1, 2011 WL 813377 *1, *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Mar. 10, 2011) appeal granted, 20 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2011) and aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
50 A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012).
48. Id.
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telephoning her at all hours, kicking in her front door, and threatening to
kill her and her children while wielding a gun.” 49 The TRO enumerated
the expected prohibitions against communication and contact between
the victim and defendant, and was accompanied by a search and seizure
warrant for Mr. Harris’s guns. 50 The no-knock warrant described the
caliber of four guns and a belt of ammunition, and gave officers full
access to the house, the garage, and the car if it was parked in the
driveway. 51
The officers went to Mr. Harris’s residence 52 that evening, placed
Mr. Harris under arrest, and proceeded to search for the guns. 53 The
police recovered three guns and ammunition: a .308 caliber assault rifle
in the attic-bedroom, five large capacity magazines with a Colt
Anaconda .45 caliber revolver from a basement safe, and a Ruger P89
handgun discovered by a gun-sniffing dog on top of the china cabinet in
the dining room. 54 The next day, the police checked the serial numbers
of the firearms and learned that the Colt Anaconda revolver had been
reported stolen. 55 The defendant, Mr. Harris, was then indicted and
charged with twelve criminal violations relating to the stolen revolver
and the unlawful possession of an assault rifle and large capacity
magazines. 56
The trial court suppressed all the evidence on the defendant’s
motion, ruling “that weapons seized pursuant to a warrant issued under
the PDVA may not be evidential in any criminal prosecution.” 57 The

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *2.
52. From both the facts contained in the opinion of the appellate court and those in the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion, it does not appear that the victim and the defendant
were cohabitating. Thus, when the search was performed, it was at the defendant’s separate,
private residence. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 20 (N.J. 2012).
53. Harris, 2011 WL 813377, at *1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The full counts were:
second-degree unlawful possession of an assault rifle, N.J.S.A.2C:39-5(f) (count
one); third-degree possession of a loaded rifle, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(2) (count two);
five counts fourth-degree possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine
(counts three, four, five, six and seven), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j); second-degree
unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count eight); third-degree
receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 20-7(a) (count nine); three counts of third-degree
certain persons not to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(3) (counts ten, eleven
and twelve).
Id.
57. Id. at *3.
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appellate division reversed in part and affirmed in part. 58 The appellate
court characterized the warrant as a “special needs warrant,” which prior
cases had ruled could not be used to “gather evidence of criminal
offenses unrelated to the domestic violence.” 59 The appellate court
therefore considered the search warrantless since the evidence was used
to prosecute the defendant for unlawful possession. 60 The court
suppressed the stolen Colt Anaconda and remanded to discover whether
the plain view exception 61 to the warrant requirement applied to the
assault rifle and ammunition. 62
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search
warrant based on reasonable cause issued under section 2C:25-28(j) was
valid under the special needs exception to the warrant clause.63 In
analyzing whether or not the weapons seized under the PDVA could be
used as evidence in a criminal prosecution, the court reviewed the
seizures under the plain view doctrine. 64 The court remanded the case to
the trial court to determine whether the officers knew the illegal nature
of the weapons when they saw them during the search. 65 The New
Jersey Supreme Court did not address arguments made by the parties
and their amici in regards to whether there was sufficient probable cause
to justify the warrant. 66 As will be discussed below, the court instead
relied on the special needs exception, but its analysis was limited to
mentioning that the exception was “[p]ertinent” and that the lower courts
had used the special needs exception in their analyses.67

58. Id. at *1.
59. Id. at *11.
60. Id.
61. The plain view exception in New Jersey involves satisfying three elements: (1) the
police officer’s presence was lawful, (2) the officer’s discovery of evidence was inadvertent,
and (3) the seizability of the evidence was “immediately apparent.” Id. at *11. The defendant
did not contest the lawfulness of the officers’ presence, and the appellate court disagreed with
the defendant’s contest of the inadvertence requirement but remanded to determine whether
their unlawful nature was “immediately apparent.” Id. at *11-12.
62. Id. at *11-12.
63. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 25-27 (N.J. 2012).
64. Id. at 28-31. The Harris court’s assessment of the facts under the plain view
doctrine will not be dealt with in this Note.
65. Id. at 31.
66. Id. at 21-23.
67. Id. at 24-26.
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II. THE SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY IN STATE V.
HARRIS
A. There Might Have Been a Special Need
The special needs exception is applicable when there is a “special
need[]” for a search, and ordinary law enforcement purposes would be
hindered by a requirement to obtain a warrant and/or probable cause.68
Some examples of “special needs” include: maintaining discipline in a
school, 69 efficiency in the workplace, 70 and proper supervision of
probationers. 71 This doctrine has two branches: one requiring an
individualized suspicion as a necessary justification for a search, and one
that does not. 72 To date, the only special needs cases in which the
Supreme Court has not required individualized suspicion have involved
drug testing. 73 In all others, the Court has required individualized
suspicion, albeit reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause to
justify the search. 74 In order to determine whether a special needs search
is “reasonable” and comports with the Fourth Amendment, the Court
engages in a balancing test: on one side is the government interest or the
“special need,” and on the other are the privacy interests of the
individual subject to the search.75
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s application of the special needs
exception has mirrored the application by the Supreme Court of the

68. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 340 (majority opinion).
70. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-22 (1987).
71. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987).
72. State in Interest of J.G., 701 A.2d 1260, 1265-66 (N.J. 1997). Waiving
individualized suspicion is a way of lessening the Fourth Amendment requirement that
warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” Id. at 1265 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2).
73. For approved programs, see generally: Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)
(testing of high school students seeking to participate in extracurricular activities); Vernonia
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (testing of schoolchildren seeking to play
interscholastic sports); Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (testing
of customs employees seeking promotion which would involve work with illicit substances or
carrying a firearm); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec.’s Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (testing of
railroad employees). For disapproved programs, see generally: Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (testing of pregnant women by hospital for use in cocaine
prosecution if they did not enroll in a drug program); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997)
(testing required for candidates seeking to run for state office).
74. See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879 (reasonable suspicion sufficient to search home
of probationer); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (reasonable suspicion
sufficient to search purse of student found smoking in the bathroom).
75. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
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United States. 76 New Jersey’s high court has applied the special needs
doctrine with careful and thorough analysis of both precedent and facts
in determining the applicability of the special needs exception and
performing the accompanying balancing test.77 In contrast, the court in
State v. Harris assumed that the special needs doctrine applied and,
without any balancing of interests at all, replaced the probable cause
requirement with reasonable cause. 78 The court noted that there were
“several exceptions to the general rule that a warrant based on probable
cause must be issued prior to any search or seizure.” 79 The majority
went on to say that the special needs exception was “[p]ertinent” and
that the lower courts had both “viewed this matter solely through the
lens of the special needs exception.”80 It is true that the appellate
division in State v. Harris invoked the special needs exception, but that
opinion similarly lacked meaningful analysis and misstated the law81–
surely not a determination warranting adoption by the higher court. 82
In State v. Harris, the court should have applied the test to
determine whether a special need existed. First, the court should have
carefully examined the state interest of protecting domestic violence
76. The New Jersey Supreme Court has applied it in cases where (1) “the requirements
of the statute [are] not ‘intended to facilitate … criminal prosecution . . .,’” (2) results of the
search were not given to the prosecutor, and (3) the warrant requirement is impractical. State
v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 276 (N.J. 2007). The court then proceeds to weigh the competing
interests. Id. (discussing how the special needs test had been applied in State in Interest of
J.G., 701 A.2d 1260 (N.J. 1997)).
77. In State in Interest of J.G., the court’s in-depth analysis spanned more than five of
the fifteen total pages in determining whether there was a special need and then weighing it
against the privacy interests of individuals who were and would be affected. 701 A.2d at
1266-72. Similarly, in State v. O’Hagen, the court performed an in-depth analysis, first
making sure the special needs doctrine applied, and then carefully weighing the interests.
O’Hagen, 914 A.2d at 277-81.
78. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 24-26 (N.J. 2012).
79. Id. at 24.
80. Id. Compare with O’Hagen, 914 A.2d at 276-81(the court went through a careful
analysis of their prior case law, a recitation of the test, and then a careful application of the
test before engaging in a balancing of interests, ultimately finding that the special needs
exception made a warrant and individualized suspicion unnecessary for DNA collection of
convicts).
81. State v. Harris, No. A-6112-09T1, 2011 WL 813377 *1, *5-*6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Mar. 10, 2011) appeal granted, 20 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2011) and aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
50 A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012). As will be noted in more detail in Part II.D, the appellate court
references “‘special needs’ warrants,” which do not exist. Id. at *5. Compare with State in
Interest of J.G., 701 A.2d at 1266-72 (the court went through U.S. Supreme Court precedent
and state precedent, laid out the full definition of the special-needs exception, and then went
through a careful application).
82. Indeed, the Harris court noted that while the findings of fact are not typically
disturbed by a court on appellate review, when “considering the legal conclusions and analysis
of the trial court, [the appellate court’s] review is plenary.” 50 A.3d at 23.
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victims from assault with deadly weapons. Had they done this, they
might have decided this interest is beyond ordinary law enforcement
purposes. The court then should have looked at the interests of the
person subject to such the search, who has an undiminished and very
high expectation of privacy in his home. The court also should have
examined the practicability of a warrant, finding that the statutory
scheme incorporates a warrant. 83 Finally, balancing these interests, the
court would have found that the law enforcement officers were not
excused from their constitutional requirement to obtain a search warrant
based on probable cause. 84
The only element of the special needs analysis that the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Harris even remotely touched on was the “special
need,” to which they looked towards the purpose of the statute to find. 85
The court recognized that the Legislature was very clear that the purpose
of the statute was “to assure the victims of domestic violence the
maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.” 86 Although the
court did not specifically state this under a special needs analysis, this
may be “beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” 87 As the
Legislature said, the primary purpose of the statute is to protect victims
of domestic violence from further harm, not to obtain evidence for
criminal proceedings against the perpetrators of the alleged violence.88
Furthermore, the search warrant is authorized by the civil part of the
statute in conjunction with a TRO, designed to protect the victim from
harm. 89 Therefore, protecting victims from assaults with weapons
through civilly authorized searches and seizures could be classified as a
non-law-enforcement special need.90
If they had established that the need qualifies under the exception,
the court should have examined how practical the warrant requirement
was, and weighed the defendant’s privacy interest against the special
need of the government to be excused from the warrant requirement.91
83. See infra Part II.B-D.
84. See infra Part II.B-D.
85. Harris, 50 A.3d at 23.
86. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2012)).
87. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
88. § 2C:25-18.
89. § 2C:25-28(j).
90. In the similar administrative-search context, the Supreme Court held that a non-law
enforcement need is not disqualified where a legislature deals with a social problem using
parallel means, one criminal and the other administrative, each permitting searches. New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 713-15 (1987).
91. Harris, 50 A.3d at 34 (Albin, J., dissenting) (discussing the balancing test that
should have been applied).
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As will be explained in detail below, if the court performed this
balancing test at all, it would have been forced to conclude that the
special needs doctrine does not apply. This is because the other two
prongs of the test cannot be satisfied: there is no diminished expectation
of privacy of the subjects of these searches, and a warrant does not
hinder the statutory scheme. 92
B.

The Subjects of the Search Have No Diminished Expectation of
Privacy

The dissent in Harris emphasized that “[t]he United States Supreme
Court has never invoked the special needs doctrine to suspend the
probable cause/warrant requirement for the search of a home—where the
privacy interests of the individual are at their highest—except in the case
of a probationer.” 93 The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled
the special needs exception could apply to belongings and persons of
students searched by school administrators; 94 offices of public
employees searched by their employers; 95 and homes of probationers
searched by probation officers.96 In each of these cases, the subject of
the search had some lower expectation of privacy, because of the
location of the search, their employment position, or their criminal
background. 97 The lower expectation of privacy in these instances
results in a balancing test of the interests of both parties. This balancing
is a better test for the reasonableness of a search, because the
requirement of probable cause presupposes an undiminished expectation
of privacy.
The search of a probationer’s home in Griffin v. Wisconsin is the
most analogous of the Supreme Court special needs cases to the searches

92. See infra Parts II.B-D.
93. Harris, 50 A.3d at 33-34 (Albin, J., dissenting).
94. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374 (2009) (the Court
found a strip search of a thirteen-year-old for over-the-counter drugs unreasonable, but used a
special needs balancing test to make that determination); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
328-29 (1985) (school administrators searched the handbag of a student while enforcing a
school policy against smoking and discovered evidence of drug dealing).
95. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (holding that the special needs
exception applied to searches of employees offices by employers, but remanded to determine
whether the search at issue in this case was reasonable).
96. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (holding that probationers have
a “conditioned liberty” and require close supervision as part of their probation).
97. Id. at 868 (probationers subject to terms of their probation); O’Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709 (1987) (government employees at their place of work subject to supervision);
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (public schoolchildren in school subject to school
rules).
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under the PDVA and State v. Harris. 98 In Griffin, two probation officers
and three police officers, acting on a tip from a detective “that there were
or might be guns in [the defendant’s] apartment,” conducted a
warrantless search of a probationer’s home. 99 This search was based
solely on “reasonable grounds,” and the searchers successfully located
the handgun to which the tip pertained. 100 The Supreme Court accepted
the need to supervise probationers for their own rehabilitation and to
protect the public as a “special need.”101
While going through the special needs analysis to determine
whether the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, the
Court emphasized repeatedly that probationers have a diminished
reasonable expectation of privacy. 102 Even the four dissenting justices
agreed that “[t]he probation officer is not dealing with an average
citizen, but with a person who has been convicted of a crime.” 103 In fact,
under Wisconsin law, probationers were considered to be “in the legal
custody of the State Department of Health and Social Services.”104
In contrast, the defendant in State v. Harris had no diminished
expectation of privacy, let alone one that approached the level of being
in the legal custody of a government agency. 105 When W.J. made the
domestic violence complaint that led to the search warrant, she told the
police that the “defendant had been arrested three months earlier for
assaulting her and that those charges remained pending.” 106 In fact, the
defendant had not been convicted of any crime that might have
conditioned his liberty in any way, nor had the defendant faced his
accuser in court–he was charged once and accused twice of domestic

98. Harris, 50 A.3d at 33-34 (Albin, J., dissenting) (“The United States Supreme Court
has never invoked the special needs doctrine to suspend the probable-cause/warrant
requirement for the search of a home—where the privacy interests of the individual are at
their highest—except in the case of a probationer.”) (discussing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868 (1987)).
99. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871.
100. Id. at 871-72.
101. Id. at 875.
102. Id. at 874 (“To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers (as we
have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special
[probation] restrictions.’”) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
103. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 870.
105. See State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 34 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting) (“The search
of a probationer’s home is obviously not comparable to that of a person accused of a crime or
a domestic violence offense.”).
106. Id. at 19 (majority opinion).
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violence. 107 According to the statutory construction and subsequent
interpretation of the PDVA by the New Jersey Supreme Court, even if
the defendant had never before been accused of domestic violence, the
police would still not have needed probable cause to obtain a warrant to
search his house for weapons. 108
Defendants in cases like Harris have an undiminished expectation
of privacy in their homes, not to mention the fact that defendants are
presumed innocent until proven guilty. 109 On this basis alone, the
situation does not fall within the bounds of the special needs exception
to the warrant clause requiring probable cause. However, there is
another independent basis for disqualifying this situation from the
special needs analysis: the third element, the impracticability of the
warrant requirement, is similarly unfulfilled. 110
C.

Requiring a Warrant Based on Probable Cause Would Not Hinder
Procedure

As Justice Blackmun stated in his concurring opinion in New Jersey
v. T.L.O., “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.” 111 In T.L.O.,
the Court recognized that the warrant and probable cause requirements
were wholly “unsuited” to the school environment because they would
“unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” 112 More pertinent to the
search of homes, the Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin came up with three
ways the “warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree
with the probation system”: (1) “a magistrate rather than a probation
officer [would] judge [] how close a supervision the probationer
requires,” (2) delay in getting a warrant would hinder probation officers’
response, and (3) the deterrent aspect would be reduced. 113 These

107. Id.
108. Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 394 (N.J. 1998) (holding that under the PDVA “a
court is not obligated to find a past history of abuse before determining that an act of domestic
violence has been committed in a particular situation”) (emphasis added).
109. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1978).
110. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (“[W]e have permitted exceptions
when ‘special needs . . . make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’”)
(internal citations omitted).
111. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 340 (majority opinion).
113. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.
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potential impediments to the statutory purpose and regime resulting from
a warrant based on probable cause made “it reasonable to dispense with
the warrant requirement.” 114
Looking at these three characteristics from the Griffin scheme, the
PDVA differs because it would not be similarly hindered by a
requirement to obtain a warrant based on probable cause.115 The
decision whether to conduct a search is already determined by a neutral
magistrate, the Family Part judge, who reviews the complaint and
decides whether to issue a TRO and other forms of relief. 116 Secondly,
because a warrant is already required by the PDVA, requiring the
warrant to be based on a higher standard, probable cause, would not
create additional delay. 117 Finally, there is also no similar deterrence
aspect of the PDVA that would give subjects of searches notice of the
fact that only reasonable cause is required. Probationers are on notice
because their liberty is conditioned, but people accused of domestic
violence have no such reason to be on notice if they have not yet been
served with the TRO and/or never have been previously accused. 118
Therefore, unlike Griffin and other special needs cases, neither a warrant
nor probable cause is impracticable to the statutory regime. 119
In fact, the statutory scheme already requires probable cause for the
first prong of the test, whether an act of domestic violence occurred,
which then allows a warrant for the search and seizure of weapons to be
issued. 120 If the police are required to demonstrate probable cause for
one of the elements to obtain the search warrant, demonstrating probable
cause as to the other elements may be an impediment but should not be
considered impracticable. This is clearly not a situation contemplated by
the U.S. Supreme Court justices in T.L.O. where “exceptional
circumstances [of the school environment] … make the warrant and
probable cause requirement impracticable ….” 121 Failure to show
114. Id. at 876-77.
115. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 34 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting).
116. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West 2012).
117. See § 2C:25-28(j); Harris, 50 A.3d at 34 (Albin, J., dissenting).
118. Harris, 50 A.3d at 34.
119. Id. (“I do not believe that the probable-cause requirement is impracticable in a
statutory scheme protecting victims of domestic violence . . . .”).
120. State v. Dispoto, 913 A.2d 791, 798 (N.J. 2007). As previously mentioned, the
New Jersey Supreme Court overruled a determination by the appellate division and required
probable cause, as opposed to reasonable cause, that an act domestic violence had occurred,
but reasonable cause remains sufficient in regards to the other two bases for the search
warrant: access/possession of a weapon and threat of that possession/access remained. Id.
121. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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exceptional circumstances should make the special needs exception
inapplicable, even without the lack of diminished privacy expectations
of the subjects of the searches under the PDVA. 122
D. The Special Needs Exception Is to Forgive the Warrant
In one way, the Harris court’s reliance on the special needs
exception at all seems strange. The anomaly in Harris is that there was
a warrant involved; all the previous special needs cases involved
completely warrantless searches. 123 The New Jersey appellate division
in Harris incorrectly stated the law when it characterized and explained
the search warrant at issue as a “‘special needs’ warrant.” 124 The court
stated:
Generally, such a warrant is not issued to secure evidence in a
criminal investigation, but to further a legitimate governmental
interest; in other words, the warrant is directed to promote the State’s
“special-needs.” Special needs warrants are typically issued upon a
showing of reasonable suspicion that a person has violated a rule or
125
regulation which the State has an interest in protecting.

The only authority the lower court in Harris cited to support that
statement of the law was T.L.O., which concerned a completely
warrantless search of a student by a school administrator and created the
special needs exception to the warrant requirement.126 If the police
obtained a warrant, then clearly obtaining a warrant was not
impracticable and the special needs doctrine could not apply. 127
The situation in State v. Harris presents an interesting conundrum.
If the police officers had gone in without a warrant, as they do under the
criminal side of the PDVA when responding to domestic violence
calls, 128 they would have had an argument for the impracticability of the
122. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 320-22 (1997) (the Court distinguished
infeasibility of individualized suspicion in prior drug testing cases from the instant case, and
consequently the special needs balancing failed).
123. See, e.g., State v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 270 (N.J. 2007); State in Interest of
J.G., 701 A.2d 1260, 1267 (N.J. 1997); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987);
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 712 (1987); T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 330 (1985).
124. State v. Harris, A-6112-09T1, 2011 WL 813377 *1, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Mar. 10, 2011) appeal granted, 20 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2011), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 50
A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012).
125. Id.
126. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
127. See supra Part II.C.
128. State v. Perkins, 817 A.2d 364, 371 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (warrantless
search allowed because special needs covered the Fourth Amendment violation as long as
criminal charges were not brought), abrogated by State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012).
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warrant and come closer to falling within the scope of the special needs
exception. 129 But, as the facts occurred, the police had a warrant based
on less than probable cause, and without the special needs exception,
violated Mr. Harris’s Fourth Amendment rights in executing it.130 This
is puzzling, because a warrant is supposed to offer the subject of a search
greater protection–not less. 131
A similar construct to the warrant sanctioned by the PDVA was
proposed by the dissent in Griffin v. Wisconsin. 132 Justice Blackmun
proposed that while the lower level of suspicion might be justified by the
special need, the warrant itself should be retained as an added “means of
protecting the probationer’s privacy.” 133 That way, the probationer
would still have the benefit of a neutral magistrate reviewing the facts,
but the probation officers would still only need to meet “reasonable
grounds” rather than probable cause. 134 Justice Blackmun pointed out
that the Court had previously made a similar exception for
administrative warrants, which can be issued by the judiciary and are
based on a standard less than probable cause.135
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected this proposition and
drew a firm line between judicial warrants and administrative search
warrants. 136 The majority found that Justice Blackmun’s suggested
solution, the solution apparently adopted by the New Jersey Legislature
and courts under the PDVA, “is a combination that neither the text of the
Constitution nor any of [the Court’s] prior decisions permits.” 137 The
Court then unequivocally affirmed a plain reading and application of the
Fourth Amendment: “it remains true that ‘[i]f a search warrant be
constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly interpreted
to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue.’” 138
The intrusion by the government into a citizen’s home to search and
seize weapons sanctioned by the PDVA is certainly a situation in which
a search warrant is constitutionally required; therefore, probable cause is
129. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877-78 (1987).
130. Harris, 50 A.3d at 18.
131. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981) (“A search warrant … is
issued upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is
located in a particular place, and therefore safeguards an individual's interest in the privacy of
his home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police.”).
132. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 882 n.1.
136. Id. at 877-78 (majority opinion).
137. Id. at 877.
138. Id. at 878 (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959)).
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the necessary foundation on which that search warrant must rely. 139
On the other hand, if the court had gone through a detailed analysis
and found the special needs doctrine applied, would it be within the
purview of the New Jersey Legislature to add a warrant as an extra level
of protection to the search? After all, courts in New Jersey have held
that the state constitution is more protective than the Federal
Constitution concerning Fourth Amendment rights.140 If the search
qualifies under the special needs exception and is therefore “reasonable”
under the Fourth Amendment, what harm could a warrant based on
reasonable cause inflict as an extra procedural safeguard? But, if the
warrant is practicable after all, then how could the search be considered
under the special needs exception in the first place? Needless to say, this
case poses several interesting questions for the special needs exception,
none of which the New Jersey Supreme Court tried to answer or even
acknowledge. This Note does not attempt to provide an answer to them,
but endeavors to point out that even if the components of the special
needs test had been met, the resulting warrant under the statute would
have been a new and interesting creature.
In summary, the special needs exception cannot apply in State v.
Harris, and other cases involving search warrants issued under section
2C:25-28(j). Even if a “special need” on the face of the statute appears
to be outside the scope of normal law enforcement,141 the warrant and
probable cause requirements are not impracticable, and are both, at least
in part, already included in the statutory regime. 142 Additionally, the
high expectation of privacy that subjects have in their homes is
undiminished and would outweigh the special need in a balancing test
for reasonableness. 143 The special needs exception therefore does not
cover warrants based on reasonable cause issued under the PDVA
section 2C:25-28(j). And even if it did, this case would have been the
first of its kind, using a warrant very close to one rejected by the
majority in Griffin. 144 Furthermore, as will be shown below, there are no
other exceptions to the constitutional requirement for searches to be

139. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (2012); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878 (quoting
Maryland, 359 U.S. at 373).
140. See State v. Miller, 777 A.2d 348, 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“This
authority to apply the State Constitution independently from and more broadly than the
federal Constitution has been exercised frequently by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
respect of search and seizure issues.”).
141. See supra Part II.A.
142. See supra Part II.C.
143. See supra Part II.B.
144. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877-78.
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supported by a warrant based on probable cause that would cover State
v. Harris, and cases like it. 145
III. NO OTHER EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT APPLY
146
TO FACTS RESEMBLING THOSE IN STATE V. HARRIS
A. The Emergency Aid Doctrine Does Not Apply to Searches
Conducted Under Section 2C:25-28(j) of the PDVA
The emergency aid doctrine may also, at first blush, appear to cover
the search for and seizure of weapons under the PDVA. Like other
exigent circumstances, the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that police may enter a house without a warrant based on probable
cause 147 where someone is “seriously injured or threatened with such
injury.” 148 Furthermore, the standard for determining whether an
officer’s emergency aid search is reasonable is whether there was an
“objectively reasonable basis” to believe that a third party needed
help. 149 An argument could be made that this is precisely the situation in
a case of domestic violence involving threats of serious injury with a
firearm. 150 Under the PDVA, there would even be probable cause that

145. See infra Section III.
146. For the purposes of this Note, I only discuss two other exceptions that come
closest to applying in this situation; I do not intend to represent that these are the only
exceptions to the warrant requirement, just that they are the most applicable, if ultimately
unsuited, to search and seizure of firearms under the PDVA. The administrative-search
exception is not applicable because the PDVA does not enforce a “regulatory scheme.” See
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987).
147. For what may be obvious reasons, this doctrine is always applied to completely
warrantless searches; if the threat were immediate, there certainly would not be time to obtain
a warrant. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (finding that one of the reasons
for refusing to apply the emergency aid doctrine was that “there [was] no suggestion that a
search warrant could not easily and conveniently have been obtained”).
148. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
149. Id. at 404-06. The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently amended their
interpretation of the test to eliminate any analysis of the subjective motivation of the officer
and now require “only that: (1) the officer had ‘an objectively reasonable basis to believe that
an emergency requires that he provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve life, or to
prevent serious injury’ and (2) there was a ‘reasonable nexus between the emergency and the
area or places to be searched.’” State v. Edmonds, 47 A.3d 737, 746 (N.J. 2012) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
150. In fact, this argument was made (unsuccessfully) in a recent New Jersey case of
reported domestic violence, also discussed infra Part III.B. State v. Edmonds, 47 A.3d 737
(N.J. 2012). In that case, the police received an unverified tip from someone claiming to be
the alleged victim’s brother that domestic violence was occurring at the victim’s residence and
there may be a gun involved. Id. at 740. When the officers arrived, the victim claimed there
was no violence, that only she and her son were in the apartment, and refused to give the
police consent to search her residence. Id. at 740-41. The police entered over her objection,
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domestic violence had occurred, and reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant had access to a gun, as well as a warrant authorizing the
search. 151
However, the emergency aid doctrine, along with all forms of
exigent circumstances, is premised on the immediacy of the threat,
specifically, to a third party, and is therefore limited in both scope and
time. 152 The Supreme Court in Mincey v. Arizona underscored that
when there was no longer any threat of violence on the premises, the
emergency aid exception was no longer valid and the police were
required to get a search warrant. 153 Cases that arise under section 2C:2528(j) of the PDVA do not fit this emergency aid doctrine because by the
time the officer conducts the search, the victim has already left the
house, given a statement, and the threat of violence—the exigency—has
already passed. 154 In an emergency, a police officer can enter the home,
secure the alleged abuser, and make sure the victim receives medical
attention if he or she needs it, but the officer cannot proceed to search
the premises for weapons without an appropriate warrant based on
probable cause. 155

verified that her son was okay, questioned the defendant boyfriend on the couch, and
proceeded to search for weapons. Id. at 741. A weapon was found under a pillow, the
defendant claimed it as his own and he was subsequently arrested and charged with illegal
possession of a weapon. Id. The alleged victim was also arrested for obstruction of justice
after explaining that it was her ex-boyfriend who has been making threatening phone calls.
Id.
151. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 32 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting).
152. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers
from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person
within is in need of immediate aid.”) (emphasis added). See also Mary Elisabeth Naumann,
Note, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26
AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 333-34 (1999) (“Under the emergency aid doctrine, the officer has an
immediate, reasonable belief that a serious, dangerous event is occurring. For example, the
officer may believe someone needs necessary medical assistance at once, believe that life or
safety is compromised, or think a crime victim needs protection.”).
153. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93.
154. State v. Harris, A-6112-09T1, 2011 WL 813377 *1, *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Mar. 10, 2011) appeal granted, 20 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2011), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 50
A.3d 15 (N.J. 2012).
155. The court in State v. Edmonds stated this limitation on scope and time very
succinctly:
The emergency-aid doctrine, particularly when applied to the entry of a home, must
be limited to the reasons and objectives that prompted the need for immediate
action. Therefore, a police officer entering a home looking for a person injured or in
danger may not expand the scope of the search by peering into drawers, cupboards,
or wastepaper baskets. When the exigency that justifies immediate action dissipates,
the rationale for searching without a warrant is no longer present.
Edmonds, 47 A.3d at 746-47 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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The Community Caretaking Doctrine Does Not Apply to Searches
Conducted Under Section 2C:25-28(j) of the PDVA

The community caretaking doctrine is yet another exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment recognizing that police
officers have duties beyond enforcing the law.156 This “wide range of
social services” other than investigation and law enforcement consists of
“aiding those in danger of harm, preserving property, and ‘creat[ing] and
maintain[ing] a feeling of security in the community.’”157 Instances of
the community caretaking function of the police are characterized by the
following factors: (1) the scope of the function the police are performing
is “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute” 158 and (2) getting
a warrant requires too much time. 159
A notably attractive facet of this doctrine is that in New Jersey, a
secondary law enforcement purpose behind the search is not dispositive
of the doctrine’s applicability. 160 Even in the context of a criminal
investigation that has already begun, police can still make warrantless
entries into homes or vehicles that fall within the community caretaking
exception. 161 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Bogan, stated:
“We will not … handcuff police officers from fulfilling a clear
community caretaking responsibility … merely because the officers are
engaged in a concurrent criminal investigation.”162 The Bogan court
went on to emphasize, “that the community caretaking responsibility
must be a real one, and not a pretext to conduct an otherwise unlawful
warrantless search.” 163 Therefore, as long as the police’s primary
function is community caretaking and not a pretext for a search, the
reasonableness test will rule Fourth Amendment violations rather than

156. See generally, Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth
Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261 (1998).
157. State v. Bogan, 975 A.2d 377, 384 (N.J. 2009) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Livingston, supra note 156, at 271-72).
158. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
159. Edmonds, 47 A.3d at 751 (“In performing these [community caretaking] tasks,
typically, there is not time to acquire a warrant when emergent circumstances arise and an
immediate search is required to preserve life or property.”). See also Livingston supra note
156, at 274.
160. For instance, the court in Diloreto found that, “[i]n addition to harboring safety
concerns as caretakers, the police lawfully accumulated information to meet the probable
cause and exigency standards before searching defendant's car.” State v. Diloreto, 850 A.2d
1226, 1237 (N.J. 2004).
161. Bogan, 975 A.2d at 386.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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the warrant and probable cause requirements, even during an active
criminal investigation.164
Interestingly enough, the most recent case in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court found the community caretaking doctrine did not apply
was an investigation of a report of domestic violence. 165 In State v.
Edmonds, 166 the police entered the alleged victim’s house over her
objections, and the court held that once the police had verified the safety
of both her and her son, their community caretaking function was
complete. 167 In the words of the Edmonds court: “[i]f the officers
wished to search the apartment for a gun, they had to apply for a warrant
supported by probable cause.” 168
In Harris, as in Edmonds, there was no immediate danger to the
community that the search was seeking to remedy, so the community
caretaking doctrine would not have applied.169 Even though the
secondary law enforcement purpose and use of the fruits of the search in
a later criminal prosecution would not have condemned the search in
Harris, there needed to be a situation necessitating a community
caretaking function directly preceding the search. 170 Therefore, while
applicable in some domestic violence situations, in the situation which
arose in Harris, as well as in most others that arise under section 2C:2528(j), the immediacy of the threat has passed. As a result, searches will

164. Id. at 388-89 (analyzing the officers’ actions in the situation and finding them
objectively reasonable and therefore constitutional). Examples of cases in which New Jersey
courts have found the community caretaking doctrine to apply include: Bogan, 975 A.2d at
378-81 (warrantless entry into a home where 12-year-old child was supposedly home alone on
a school day in order to talk to the child’s parents on the phone where officer spotted the
suspect involved in a molestation the officer was investigating); Diloreto, 850 A.2d at 1232,
1234-35 (defendant who had been mistakenly listed as an endangered missing person found
asleep in his car near a known location for suicide attempts was patted down and found to
have ammunition on him, and was subsequently charged and convicted of murder, an armed
robbery of a gas station, and possessory offenses regarding the weapons); and State v. Garbin,
739 A.2d 1016, 1018-19 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. 1999) (warrantless search of a garage emitting
smoke and the smell of burned rubber revealed defendant, who was then found guilty of
driving while intoxicated).
165. State v. Edmonds, 47 A.3d 737, 753 (N.J. 2012).
166. As a point of interest, this case was decided 5-1, one month before State v. Harris,
and perhaps unsurprisingly, Justice Albin, the author of the dissent in Harris, authored the
majority opinion in Edmonds. Id. at 737.
167. Id. at 752.
168. Id. The single dissenting justice in Edmonds discussed the PDVA along with the
importance of protecting domestic violence victims who might be shielding their own abusers
and found the officers’ conduct in this case reasonable under both the community caretaking
and the emergency aid exceptions. Id. at 755-57 (Patterson, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 752 (majority opinion).
170. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 20 (N.J. 2012).
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not be excused from the requirement of a warrant supported with
probable cause by the community caretaking doctrine.171
In summary, the special needs exception is inapplicable, 172 and
none of the other exceptions to the warrant clause allow the search
conducted in State v. Harris. Both the emergency aid and the
community caretaking exceptions fail because the immediacy of the
threat to the alleged victim has already passed by the time the search is
conducted.173 Because there is no exception to cover the searches
conducted under a warrant based on reasonable cause pursuant to the
PDVA section 2C:25-28(j), the Legislature should change the way the
search warrants are issued in order to bring it into conformance with the
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and
Article I, Paragraph seven of the New Jersey Constitution.
IV. THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT WOULD BE JUST AS
EFFECTIVE USING WARRANTS BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE
This Note does not mean to undercut the gravity of protecting
victims of domestic violence from abuse involving deadly weapons.
The type of violence that led to the passing of laws like the PDVA is
horrific and most deserving of a strong legal remedy. 174 Indeed, many
states have statutes restricting domestic abusers’ rights to bear arms. 175
The enforcement mechanisms vary among states; some ask for a
voluntary surrender, 176 some add on a penalty for failing to surrender the
firearms, 177 and some issue an order prohibiting possession without any

171. Edmonds, 47 A.3d at 751.
172. See supra Part II.
173. See supra Parts III.A-B.
174. See generally Benjamin Thomas Greer & Jeffrey G. Purvis, Judges Going Rogue:
Constitutional Implications When Mandatory Firearm Restrictions Are Removed From
Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 275 (2011) (discussing
the dangers of not enforcing firearms restrictions); Johnson, supra note 26 (recounting several
problems with the former PDVA necessitating the complete overhaul); Memoli & Plotino,
supra note 5 (discussing some of the cases and lapses in enforcement that led to the push to
change the statute); Luo, supra note 5.
175. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.100 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133602(E) (2010) (West); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(11) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit.10, § 1045(a)(11) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-26-5-9 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. tit.19-A, § 4006 (2012); MD. CODE ANN.,
Fam. Law § 4-506 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 842a (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-3.1 (2009).
176. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B3.1(a) (2009); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842a (McKinney 2010).
177. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E) (2010) (arrest for violation of the
protection order); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-3.1(j) (2009).
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enforcement mechanism at all.178 New Jersey has been “progressive” in
fighting domestic violence.179 But as the dissent in Harris notes, New
Jersey stands completely alone in one aspect of its approach to weapons
and domestic violence—it requires only reasonable cause to obtain a
search warrant. 180
Part A of this section will briefly review the laws of states that take
guns out of the hands of alleged abusers and how they operate in
comparison with New Jersey’s PDVA. Part B will recommend how the
New Jersey’s legislature could bring the PDVA into conformance with
the warrant clause without sacrificing the protection of potential victims
of domestic violence.
A. States Allowing Search Warrants for Weapons That Require
Probable Cause in Domestic Violence Situations
Only five states besides New Jersey authorize a warrant for the
search and seizure of weapons in cases of domestic violence – Maine,
Hawaii, California, New Hampshire, and Delaware.181 Each of those
states, except Delaware, first orders the voluntary surrender of the
weapons; only if the respondent fails to comply will a court authorize a
search warrant. 182 They also require the warrant to be based on probable
cause specifically related to the weapons, not just the domestic
violence. 183 New Hampshire requires “probable cause to believe such
firearms and ammunition and specified deadly weapons are kept on the
premises or curtilage of the defendant and … reason to believe that all
such firearms and ammunition and specified deadly weapons have not
been relinquished by the defendant.”184 Maine goes a step further and
requires probable cause to believe that the respondent has not

178. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.66.100 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., Fam. Law §
4-506 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9 (West 2011); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842a
(McKinney 2013).
179. Memoli & Plotino, supra note 5, at 50.
180. State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 35-36 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 35. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(11) (1999); ME. REV. STAT.
tit.19-A, § 4006 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE §
1524(a)(11) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002).
182. Harris, 50 A.3d at 35; ME. REV. STAT. tit.19-A, § 4006(2-A) (2012); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(11) (West 2011); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002).
183. Harris, 50 A.3d at 35; ME. REV. STAT. tit.19-A, § 4006 (2-A) (2012); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(11) (West 2011); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002).
184. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002).
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relinquished the weapons. 185 Hawaii requires police officers to apply for
a regular search warrant if the respondent refuses to surrender the
weapons in the absence of a consensual search of the premises. 186
California lists domestic violence among the grounds to obtain a regular
search warrant for weapons and ammunition. 187 Again, all of these
statutes require not only probable cause, but also a failure of the
respondent to voluntarily surrender their weapons in compliance with
the court’s protective order.188
Delaware’s statute is the only one comparable to New Jersey’s
PDVA in that the search warrant can be authorized without the
precondition of a failure to voluntarily surrender a weapon.189 But, as
the dissent in Harris points out, Delaware requires a showing that: (1)
the respondent possesses a firearm; (2) the “[p]etitioner can describe,
with sufficient particularity, both the type and location of the firearm”;
and (3) “[r]espondent has used or threatened to use a firearm against the
petitioner, or the petitioner expresses a fear that the respondent may use
a firearm against them.” 190 Currently, section 2C:25-28(j) of the New
Jersey PDVA contains no such nexus requirement between the
possession of the weapon by an alleged domestic abuser and the threat it
poses to the victim. 191 The three-pronged standard of evaluation
developed by the New Jersey appellate division in Johnson, and later
adapted and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Dispoto, does
contain the requirement that the “defendant’s possession or access to that
weapon poses a heightened or increased risk of danger to the victim.” 192
However, the Magistrate must only find there is reasonable cause for this
conclusion. 193

185. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4006(2-A) (2012).
186. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006).
187. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(11) (West 2011). Though not explicitly stated in
that section of the statute, a California court held that probable cause is the appropriate
standard for the issuance of a search warrant under section 1524 in Frazzini v. Superior Court,
7 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1012 (1970).
188. Harris, 50 A.3d at 35; ME .REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4006(2-A) (2012); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 134-7(f) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(11) (West 2011); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(ii) (2002).
189. Harris, 50 A.3d at 35; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(11) (1999).
190. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(11) (1999).
191. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (West 2005); State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 36 (N.J.
2012) (Albin, J., dissenting).
192. State v. Johnson, 799 A.2d 608, 626 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
193. Id.; see also supra Part I.B.
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B. The New Jersey Prevention Against Domestic Violence Act Can
Protect Victims Without Vitiating Constitutional Rights of
Defendants
The disparity between the approaches taken by New Jersey and
other states does not necessarily mean that New Jersey needs to emulate
any one of the other approaches; the PDVA and its application just need
to conform to the requirements that warrants be based on probable cause
contained in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and Article
I, Paragraph seven of the New Jersey Constitution. 194 The two
dissenting justices in Harris offer a solution built on New Jersey case
law that would protect victims from violence without violating the
constitutional rights of defendants. 195 Justice Albin wrote:
[i]n my view, so long as the court makes a determination that there is
(1) probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has
been committed by the defendant; (2) probable cause to believe a
search for and seizure of weapons is necessary to protect the life,
health or well-being of a victim on whose behalf the relief is sought;
and (3) probable cause to believe that the weapons are located in the
place to be searched, a warrant issued under this statute is
196
constitutionally sound.

This is simply an enhancement of the standard formulated in
Johnson and Dispoto. 197 The dissenting judges insist that the standard of
probable cause in a domestic violence situation, while heightened in
comparison to reasonable cause, “would be somewhat different than”
that for a criminal search warrant.198 It would then appropriately cover
prosecution for weapons found in plain view and violating sections of
the criminal code, like those in Harris. 199
The New Jersey Legislature should alter section 2C:25-28(j) to
include a test like the one proposed by the dissenting justices. In fact, a
bill attempting to alter this very section of the statute was introduced in
January of 2012. 200 The amendment to the statute would require that
both civil and criminal complaints under the PDVA to be heard
exclusively in superior court rather than municipal court. 201 The

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2; N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 7.
State v. Harris, 50 A.3d 15, 36 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting).
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Assemb. B. 1105, 215th Leg., 2012 Sess. (N.J. 2012).
Id.
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Legislature has been willing to change the statute in the past to make it
more effective 202 and is already in the process of changing the
procedures. 203 Adjusting the burden of proof to enable a search and
seizure warrant issued under the PDVA to comport with the federal and
state constitutions is a necessary change well within the reach of the
Legislature.
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States is
“the supreme Law of the Land,” not a suggestion that can be
disregarded. 204 Other states’ legislatures and courts have taken this into
account when drafting and enforcing their statutes concerning the
seizure of weapons in domestic violence situations.205 It is high time for
New Jersey to do the same. Domestic violence can be a heinous
crime 206 and absolutely deserves the strictest treatment and investigation
possible, but this cannot and must not be accomplished at the expense of
fundamental, constitutional rights. Therefore, New Jersey’s courts
and/or legislature must require warrants under the PDVA section 2C:2528(j)to show probable cause in regards not only to the act of domestic
violence, but also to the possession of a deadly weapon and the threat it
poses to the alleged victim. 207
CONCLUSION
The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act’s issuance of a search
and seizure warrant based on reasonable cause violates the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph
seven of the New Jersey Constitution. Contrary to the majority’s
holding in State v. Harris, the special-needs exception does not apply
because: (1) the persons searched have no diminished expectation of
privacy, 208 and (2) obtaining a warrant is not impracticable in the

202. Since the current version of the statute was enacted in 1991, the PDVA has been
amended four times. In fact, the warrant for the search and seizure was not part of the 1991
statute; it was added in the first amendment, which was enacted in 1994. Crimes—Domestic
Violence—Stalking, ch. 94, sec. 4, § 12 P.L. 1991, c. 261 (C. 2C:25–28(j)) (1994), amended
by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (West 2005).
203. Assemb. B. 1105, 215th Leg.,(N.J. 2012).
204. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land”). See also Article I, Paragraph 7 of New Jersey’s own state constitution, which
contains its own formulation of the warrant clause, is also considered supreme. Byrnes v.
Boulevard Comm'rs of Hudson County, 197 A. 667, 670 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1938) aff'd, 3 A.2d 456
(1939) (“The supreme law of the state is its Constitution.”).
205. See supra Part IV.A.
206. See supra note 173.
207. See supra Part IV.B.
208. See supra Part II.B.
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statutory scheme. 209 Even if the special needs exception did apply, it
would forgive the warrant entirely, not permit a warrant based on
reasonable cause. 210 Furthermore, other exceptions to the warrant
clause, including the emergency aid doctrine and the community
caretaking doctrine, which were not explored by the court, are equally
unsuited to bring the statute into compliance with the Fourth
Amendment. 211
The grave problem of domestic violence must be combated within
the bounds of the Constitution. 212 The warrant clause of the Constitution
demands that there be probable cause as the basis for the warrant under
the PDVA in regards to the threat of the weapon and the existence and
location of the premises. 213 The New Jersey legislature should rectify
the problem by redrafting the language in the statute. If New Jersey
wants to preserve the right to prosecute for weapons violations
discovered by these civil searches, then all it has to do is make sure that
there is probable cause to issue the warrant to search. Until the statutory
language is fixed, New Jersey’s search and seizure of weapons with
warrants based on reasonable cause under the PDVA will continue to
violate the fundamental right of its citizens to be free from unreasonable
searches and intrusions in their homes.
Kelly Heuser*

209. See supra Part II.C.
210. See supra Part II.D.
211. See supra Parts III.A-B.
212. See supra Part IV.
213. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 2.
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